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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the relationship between cash dividends and value for American 
firms.  It  follows Fama and French “Taxes,  Financing Decisions  and Firm Value” 
(1998). Fama and French found that dividends convey information about profitability 
that are missed even when they control for variables such as earnings, investments 
and research and development (R&D), in the time-period 1965-1992. We extend the 
data-set to see if the effect of dividends is still  relevant for the period 1965-2008. 
Fama and French ran regressions on all firms found in the Compustat database that 
had the relevant variables, and so do we. In addition, we run a set of regressions only 
on firms listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX to filter  effects  of  low liquidity 
stocks.
Our findings are in line with Fama and French and we are both able to confirm their 
results  for the time-period 1965-1992 and 1965-2008. The slopes of the dividend-
coefficients  are  just  as strong when we run regressions  on NYSE, NASDAQ and 
AMEX only. We also confirm Lintner’s findings on dividend-smoothing and discover 
tax-effects around large changes in the tax-code in boom-periods.
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INTRODUCTION
Background
Dividends form the basis of valuation through the dividend discount model (DDM). 
The basic logic is that a company is as valuable as the discounted value of its future 
cumulative payouts to shareholders. On the other hand, Miller and Modigliani proved 
dividends irrelevant in their famous dividend irrelevance theorem. Although stylistic 
and theoretic in form, the theorem has gained widespread acceptance and appliance. 
The logic is appealing: The firm has the choice to pay out its earnings to shareholders 
as dividends or re-invest them. If they re-invest they will increase the worth of the 
firm, and consequently the share price will go up. The benefit for the shareholder will 
be the same. However, the firm will have to pay out its earnings to its shareholders  
some time (at least in theory), as this is the basis of the firm value.
Conversely, and to our surprise, we have not been able to find many papers discussing 
dividends  in  relation  to  pricing.  Most  who do,  focus  on  events  relating  to  extra-
ordinary dividends, changes in dividend policy, and tax-effects. Papers that explore 
dividends over time tend to treat the dividend in a binary way, trying to find reasons 
for why firms do or do not pay dividends. The most prominent paper of the latter form 
is Disappearing dividends or a lower propensity to pay? (Fama & French, 2001). In 
this paper the authors establish as fact that fewer firms pay dividends than before. 
This is an important backdrop to our research, but the binary method is not sufficient 
to answer our question. However, the total amount of dividends paid in the economy 
is steadily increasing. Further information is found on page 35.
A paper that  strikes  closer to home is  another  paper from  Fama & French,  1998, 
Taxes, Financing Decisions, and Firm Value, published in the Journal of Finance. The 
paper  use  cross-sectional  regressions  to  study  how  a  firm’s  value  is  related  to 
dividends and debt. Although the aim of the authors is to study tax-effects, they also 
find that dividends convey information about the share price that is not absorbed by 
the other variables (earnings, investments and R&D). We find the method appealing, 
and the results seem robust. And since we have not been able to find any other papers 
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that tackle the relationship between pricing and dividends better, we will base this 
paper on the method of Fama & French, 1998.
Structure
The  structure  of  this  paper  is  as  follows.  First  we  conduct  a  literature  review,  a 
summary of the most important milestones in the research on dividends. This will 
hopefully give the reader a basic understanding of what research tell us so far about 
dividends  related  to  our  research  question.  Readers  familiar  with  the  theory  of 
dividends can easily skip this part. The bulk of this paper is naturally made up of our 
own findings, and we start the analysis by going through our method and how we 
have have extracted the data. We hope that we are able to do this as short and intuitive 
as possible, and save the full recipe for the appendix. The results will be in the form 
of tables with values from our regressions, and commented in the text. We will round 
off with a conclusion and a summary of our most important findings.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Historical background
Research on dividends did not start in earnest until the middle of the 20th century. But 
in order to understand the development of dividends and its continued prevalence, we 
will start with a short history lesson.1 Dividends were a necessary answer to investor’s 
need for return on their  funds and corporate entities’  wish for survival.  When the 
tradition of liquidation of the ship or flotilla upon return in the 1600’s was superseded 
by the likes of the Dutch East India Trading Company, which were companies there 
to stay, dividends were paid to cater investor interests. The emphasis on dividends 
changed  to  earnings  (in  relation  to  valuation)  as  corporations  survived  for  longer 
periods of time, but with the expansion and investments in infrastructure in Britain 
and the US,  dividends again gained importance.  Parallel  with the development  of 
corporate  practises,  laws  were  passed  that  opened  up  for  limited  liability  and 
shareholder  rights. Canal and railway companies were the first to issue preference 
shares  around  the  turn  of  the  18th  century.  Researchers  point  to  the  lack  of 
transparency up to the 20th century as a reason to why dividends were important, as 
investors came to rely on the dividends as a pricing mechanism instead of profits 
(Frankfurter  & Wood,  1997).  Although the  20th century  ushered in  a  new era of 
corporate practices which increased transparency, including the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average and Moody’s Industrial Security, dividends still rose to even higher levels. 
Dividend payout varied in the years following the crash in 1929, but in general they 
were declining until  World War II  ended (Jones & Wilson, 2002).  After  the war, 
dividends rose again and it has continued to rise in total (total dividends paid pr year),  
but the number of firms that pay dividends have been steadily declining (Fama &
French, 2002).
Theoretical background
There are in general two questions research on dividends and dividend policies have 
been trying to shed light on; How do (or should) firms set their dividend policy? Why 
do (or should) firms pay dividends? The answers to these questions are very complex, 
1 Based on Benrud, 2009 published in the book Baker, 2009.
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as research only partly answers the first and still does not have a good answer to the 
latter.
As to  how firms  set  their  dividend  policy;  Lintner,  1956,  is  still  accepted  as  the 
founder of modern dividend policy theory. He suggests that firms set a target payout 
ratio and react to lasting changes in earnings by smoothing the dividend payouts over 
the next years. Lintner carried out both qualitative surveys, through interviews with 
senior executives, and quantitative surveys on dividend policy in the US. Although 
small in scope, in respect to the number of companies surveyed (28), he claims that 
his data is representative for the larger economy. This was groundbreaking work at 
the time, since it was the first serious effort to gain a better understanding of dividend 
policy, and laid the foundation for further research. What he found was that dividends 
are a function of long-term sustainable earnings. He derived the following equation:
Dt = 352.3 + .15Pt + .70 Dt-1
Where Dt equals dividends at time t, Pt is profits (net income) at time t and Dt-1 is last 
year’s dividends.  Here the profit is adjusted for inventory gains. The main point of 
his  paper  is  that  dividends are  by and large dependent  on two factors:  last  year’s 
dividends and this year’s profits. The first indicates that there is a strong tendency of 
smoothing, so that dividends do not adjust  to a new level of earnings right away, 
rather they slowly revert to the new level in the course of some period of years. This 
is reflected in the heavy weight Dt-1 carries in the equation above. In his interviews 
with senior executives he discovered that they were very reluctant to change the level 
of  dividends  before  they  felt  sure  that  the  new level  was  sustainable.  This  is  an 
indication that managers are sensitive to a signalling effect, namely that a change in 
dividends is a strong signal to the market about how the company views the future. 
We will return to the signalling effect later.
As to why companies pay dividends, there seem to be no clear answer. Most theories; 
Miller & Modigliani, 1961, Black, 1976, Myers, 1984 suggest that companies either 
should not pay dividends at all or that they should pay very low dividends.  Gordon,
1959, suggested that dividends form the basis of valuation. Popular theories are cost-
benefit  trade  offs  between  sources  of  financing,  a  pecking  order  of  sources  of 
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financing  and  a  principal  agent  problem  between  managers  and  equity  investors. 
Theories of sources of financing suggests that firms should not pay dividends. The 
principal agency problem suggests that managers could be disciplined with a dividend 
policy (Black, 1976).  However, managers are better disciplined with debt leverage, 
and the firm receives an interest tax shield increasing the value of the firm using debt 
(Jensen, 1986). There is no tax shield received using a dividend policy. Therefore, we 
are still left guessing. Why do firms pay dividends? In the words of Black: “We don’t 
know.”
The importance of dividends and its effect on pricing of stocks was cast into serious 
doubt by  Miller & Modigliani,  1961. Through logical reasoning they showed how 
dividend payout policies are irrelevant for the current valuation of a company. They 
argued  that  the  value  of  a  company  is  solely  given  by  the  recursive  formula  of 
discounting next period’s earnings minus investments and the value of the firm after 
the next period. They proved that this holds true under assumptions of perfect capital 
markets,  rational  behavior  and perfect  certainty,  and further  still  holds  true  under 
uncertainty. However, they recognize that the dividend payout ratio, under the special 
case when a firm’s  growth is  solely financed by retained earnings,  influences  the 
growth  rate.  In  this  special  case,  the  dividend  policy  becomes  equivalent  to 
investment policy.
According to  Miller & Modigliani, 1961, a firm has the same value whether it pays 
dividends or not. However, they recognizes that asymmetric information and principal 
agency problems do influence value in the sense that signaling effects from changes 
in dividend policy influences the valuation of companies, especially for firms with a 
long history of paying steady dividends. In their final sentence, they admit to thinking 
that investors are not always rational in decision making: “For investors,  however 
naive they may be when they enter the market, do sometimes learn from experience; 
and perhaps, occasionally, even from reading articles such as this.”
The dividend puzzle
Despite the irrelevance of dividends, as pointed out by Miller and Modigliani, firms 
still pay out dividends. Fischer Black coined this “the dividend puzzle” in 1976. He 
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offers  some possible  explanations,  but  no  conclusion.  One  of  his  theories  is  that 
investors are simply irrational. They may prefer dividends because they are paid out 
immediately, what others have called the “bird in the hand fallacy.”
According to  Black,  1976,  trade  off  theory  states  that  retaining  earnings  and not 
paying dividends  is  the  cheapest  source  of  financing,  such that  companies  would 
prefer retaining earnings over taking on more debt. He recognizes that investors of 
levered companies  might  prefer  $1 in  dividends over  $1 in  retained earnings  that 
might end up in creditors pockets. However, assuming that they can negotiate better 
terms on the company’s credits if they agree not to pay any dividends, Black suggests 
that the benefits will outweigh negative effects of paying lower dividends.
Bottom line is that companies still pay out dividends, but financial theorists are not 
able to explain why. It must be pointed out, however, that when financial theorists are 
trying  to  explain  a  phenomena,  it  is  based  on the  principle  that  all  investors  are 
rational  actors  seeking to  maximize  profit  over  risk.  Irrationality  is  not taken into 
account,  such  as  specific  feelings  towards  a  certain  company  (e.g.  family-owned 
business) that would make the investor less inclined to disinvest.
The Capital Structure Puzzle
The pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) does not explain why firms pay dividends, 
but  when firms  choose  to  pay dividends  for  unknown reasons,  the  pecking  order 
theory will affect dividend considerations. According to Myers dividends are sticky, 
meaning that variations in cash flows will  be absorbed by debt.  Fama and French 
performed a test of the trade-off and pecking order theories (Fama & French, 2002). 
They found that  firms  with more  volatile  cash  flows are  inclined  to  pay out  less 
dividends  to  avoid  the  risk  of  having  to  issue  costly  debt  or  equity.  This  holds 
according to Fama and French under both pecking order and trade off theories. In the 
trade off model, firms with higher investments to earnings ratios, have lower free cash 
flows and less need to discipline managers with dividends. Low dividends help to 
avoid underinvestment problems from investments financed by risky debt. Pecking 
order  theory  says  that  firms  with  high  investments  to  earnings  should  pay  lower 
dividends to maintain capacity for low-risk debt.
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Why dividends, then?
Since dividends cannot be explained by applying financial theory to perfect markets, 
scholars have searched for market-imperfections to find reasons for dividends. Baker,
Powell & Veit, 2002, sum up these as the major three:
● taxes
● agency cost
● information asymmetry (signaling)
and the minor small:
● transaction cost
● flotation cost
● irrational investor behavior
Miller & Modigliani, 1961, touches upon at least the major imperfections, but others 
have  taken  this  research  further.  We  will  in  the  following  go  through  the  most 
important papers that have discussed these issues. The research can be divided into 
three groups: theoretical,  surveys and empirical.  The theoretical papers discuss the 
issue from an analytical and rational point of view, but are not providing any evidence 
in the form of data.  The ones that do, are either  based on surveys,  or analysis  of 
historical data. Since this paper is an empirical study of historical data, the latter is 
naturally  of most interest  to  us.  There is  also a considerable amount  of empirical 
studies that apply event studies. These try to explain dividend effects by studying the 
the  movements  in  stock  prices  around  important  dates,  such  as  the  dividend 
declaration date and the ex-dividend date. We will not spend much time discussing 
these.
Taxes
Taxes is a major imperfection and was one of the first arguments against Miller and 
Modigliani’s theorem. What matters to the shareholders is the value they are left with 
after taxes. This means that if dividends are taxed less than capital gains, investors 
would  prefer  dividends  over  retained  earnings.  But  the  fact  of  the  matter  is  that 
dividends have historically been taxed more heavily than capital  gains. Miller  and 
Modigliani recognized this imperfection, and noted that this should, in the case that 
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taxes matter, give a premium to firms that did not pay out dividends. However, this 
was not a primary subject, since the availing attitude of the time was that firms that 
paid a dividend, should trade at a premium. Farrar & Selwyn, 1967, picked up on this 
issue, and found that when there is a difference between personal and corporate taxes, 
there exists an equilibrium where dividends are not paid out at all. The tax-effect have 
however, been cast in doubt in later research. In the US, pension- and college funds 
are exempt from taxes. This usually means that they prefer (or at least are indifferent 
to) dividends, as opposed to other investors that, at least until 20031, paid more taxes 
on dividends than on capital  gains. This also means that other investors can trade 
away the dividend, by selling their stock just before the ex-dividend date, and buy 
them  them  back  afterwards.  Another  branch  of  the  tax-effect  research  is  on  the 
clientele-effect,  i.e.  that  companies  cater  to  their  main  investors  needs,  so  that  if 
investors  prefer  dividends,  the company pays out dividends.  Miller  & Modigliani,
1961,  mentioned  this  in  their  paper,  and  the  effect  has  been  confirmed  by  later 
research (Elton & Gruber, 1970).
Agency Cost
Managers  are  not  perfect  agents  of  their  owners.  Especially  in the public  market, 
where  ownership  is  dispersed,  can  the  incentives  and goals  of  managers  be  quite 
different from those of the investors. Investors are generally profit-maximizing and 
demand a certain return for the perceived risk they are taking. But investors have the 
possibility to diversify risk, managers have not. This may lead managers to be more 
risk-averse than the investors want them to be, since managers stand to lose their jobs 
and positions. Managers may also put as much weight on corporate perks (private jets, 
expensive offices, etc.) and power,  as they put on improving profits, and engage in 
empire-building to enhance their stature and self-image. What managers then try to do 
is  to  increase  slack  and  build  up  a  larger  cash-balance,  to  off-set  the  risk  of 
bankruptcy and use as a war-chest in case of hostile take-overs or declining revenues. 
This is  not value-enhancing and hurts shareholders.  Issuing dividends is  a way of 
dispensing   the  extra  cash,  tighten  the  management  structure  and  discipline 
management to maintain profit-margins.
1 The tax-system was changed in 2003, so that both dividends and capital gains are taxed at the same 
rate (Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003). The tax-relief was set to expire in 2010 
but has been extended by the Obama-administration.
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Jensen, 1986, argues that the reason dividend cuts are punished with large stock price 
reductions in the capital market is due to agency costs. The market assumes that a cut 
in dividends leave managers with more cash, which they will waste on less profitable 
ventures.
Information effects
Issuing dividends force firms to go to to the market to get financing for new projects, 
either in the bond-market or by issuing equity, instead of useing retained earnings. 
Easterbrook,  1984,  argues  that  by going to  the market,  “the  firm's  affairs  will  be 
reviewed by an investment banker or some similar intermediary acting as a monitor 
for the collective interest of shareholder.” This lowers the agency cost of monitoring 
and increase value for investors. The other advantage, states Easterbrook, is that this 
gives the firm the possibility to constantly adjust their debt/equity ratio so that it is 
value-enhancing.
Signaling
Following  up  on  the  work  of  Lintner,  1956;  Baker,  Farrelly  &  Edelman,  1985, 
conducted a survey in 1985 of 318 NYSE-registered firms about their attitudes and 
beliefs  regarding dividends.  They sent  forms  to  562 firms.  Their  findings  mainly 
confirm those of Lintner, but they point to some additional factors that are useful. 
They find that managers generally believe that dividends affect stock-prices, contrary 
to Miller & Modigliani, 1961. This supports the signalling-theory, and confirms that 
managers find that issuing dividends is a good way of conveying information about 
their  view of the future for the company. The survey also found that the utilities-
industry has a much higher dividend payout-ratio than other industries such as retail 
and manufacturing.  They point to the inherent differences in the nature of utilities 
(regulation) as a possible explanation for this, and suggests that it might be useful to 
single  out  utilities  in  any  survey  concerning  dividends.  Baker  followed  up  this 
research in collaboration with other researches both in the US and abroad (also in 
Norway). The findings support Lintner’s original work, and suggests that, with a few 
minor local variations, that the attitudes towards dividends are the same in most of the 
world.
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Other transactions with shareholders: Share buy-backs
Another way of transferring wealth to the shareholders, and decrease cash-holdings of 
the  firm,  is  through  the  buy-back  of  shares.  Recent  empirical  research  (Fama  &
French, 2002) indicates that buy-backs have in some respect taken over for dividends, 
and that newly established firms prefer buy-backs to dividends. Surveys also suggest 
(Baker, Farrelly & Edelman, 1985) that managers view buy-backs as a more flexible 
way of  returning  wealth  to  shareholders  than  dividends.  A buy-back  of  shares  is 
usually met with a positive market-reaction, since this signals that the management 
views its stock as undervalued. We did consider including share buy-backs in our 
research, but decided against it since this would fall outside the scope of this paper. 
Although both dividends and share buy-backs share some common features, such as 
decreasing the cash-balance and sends a positive signal to the market, they also differ 
in other aspects. Dividends represent an actual cash inflow to the shareholders without 
any of them having to trade shares or diminish their ownership share. Dividends are 
also  perceived  differently  and  is  usually  interpreted  as  a  stronger  signal  of 
management’s view of the future than buy-backs (Baker, Farrelly & Edelman, 1985).
In this paper we will research whether investors appreciate dividends. If they do, that 
should be reflected in the market value of companies paying dividends, as all else 
equal, investors would be willing to pay a premium for dividend paying stocks over 
non-paying stocks.
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METHODOLOGY
The  basic  hypothesis  is  that  dividends  convey  information  about  the  future 
profitability and thus the value of a firm that is not conveyed through other variables, 
such as earnings and investments. This is in line with the signaling theory described 
above. We are, however, not viewing this from the management side the way Lintner 
did, but from an investor’s point of view. If investors believe that dividends convey 
information about future profitability, then a higher dividend should yield a higher 
premium, all else equal. Likewise, an increase (decrease) in dividends, should yield a 
higher (lower) value. Of course, in order to isolate the effect of dividends, we need to 
control for other variables that conventionally convey information about profitability.
Fama and French
We follow the cross-sectional  method Fama and French use in their  paper  Taxes,  
Financing  Decisions  and Firm Value  (1998),  and will  now explain  their  method. 
Their regression is based on the principle that the market value of a firm is (Fama &
French, 1998, p. 820):
i. the  market  value  of  an  all-equity  no-dividends  firm  with  the  same  pretax  
expected net cash flows (cash earnings before interests, dividends, and taxes,  
less investment outlays), plus
ii. the value of the tax effects of the firm’s expected dividend and interest 
payments
If one is able to capture the information effects about expected future profitability, or 
as Fama and French write,  expected net cash flows in financing decisions,  then the 
slopes, or coefficients, on dividends and debt, should isolate tax effects. 
In  accordance  with  tax-theory,  they  expected  the  dividend-coefficients  to  have 
negative signs. As already mentioned, they found the opposite. We therefore expect 
the  dividend  coefficients  to  be  positive.  In  other  words,  the  positive  effect  of 
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dividends (which according to theory, may be due to signalling effects or other factors 
described in the literature review) triumphs any negative tax-effects.
Fama and French use the variables  Earnings,  Investments  and R&D, to proxy for 
future profit and thereby value. They use this year’s values, as well as the growth over 
the past two and next two years (according to Fama and French, who cite Fama, 1990, 
two years is as far as the market is able to predict), to proxy for expected net cash 
flows.  We  do  not  believe  that  these  variables  capture  all  the  information  about 
expected net cash flows, but with data on this aggregate level, it is not a far-fetched 
idea that they overall capture the most relevant information. The value of a firm, the 
dependent variable, is measured by the “spread of value over cost, Vt-At,” i.e. the total 
market  value  of  equity  and  debt,  minus  assets.  Fama  and  French  also  include  a 
variable that is meant to capture the unexpected changes in value, dVt+2/At. The logic 
of  this  is  that  if  an  expected  change  in  a  variable  has  a  positive  effect  on  the 
dependent variable,  and an unexpected change has a positive effect on Vt+2. Using 
Kothari & Shanken, 1992, Fama and French argue that the slope of dVt+2/At should 
then be negative. Even though dVt+2/At is not perfectly correlated with the unexpected 
future changes in the variables,  it  provides a check for unexpected changes in the 
variable  components.  Again,  according to  Fama and French,  the signs on dVt+2/At 
should be opposite those of the variables that measure future changes (t+2), if it is to 
capture those effects. We will later see that this is the case.
All values are scaled to assets, to avoid the effect of big firms influencing the results 
more than small firms (heteroscedasticity). Fama and French apply four regressions, 
with two different dependent variables: spread of value over cost (regressions 1 and 2) 
and  the  change  in  value  over  cost  (regressions  3  and  4).  On  each  of  these  two 
dependent variables they measure change in dividend- and debt-levels (regression 1 
and 3), and dividend- and debt-policy (regression 2 and 4). The first regression looks 
like this:
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(Vt – At)/At = a + a1Et/At + a2dEt/At + a3dEt+2/At 
+ a4dAt/At + a5dAt+2/At
+ a6RDt/At + a7dRDt/At + a8dRDt+2/at
+ b1It/At + b2dIt/At + b3dIt+2/At
+ b4Dt/At + b5dDt/At + b6dDt+2/A
+ c1dVt+2/At + et (1)
Where V=Market Value, A=Book Value of Assets, E=Earnings, RD=Research and 
Development, I=Interest Payments, D=dividends, a-c are the regression coefficients 
and e is the error variable. The notation d is for change. This means that e.g. dE t/At= 
(Et– Et-2)/At and d(Dt / At ) = Dt / At - Dt-2 / At-2. Interest is a proxy for the debt-level. 
D/A is a proxy for dividend policy. Regression 2:
(Vt – At)/At = a + a1Et/At + a2dEt/At + a3dEt+2/At 
+ a4dAt/At + a5dAt+2/At
+ a6RDt/At + a7dRDt/At + a8dRDt+2/at
+ b1It/At + b2d(It/At) + b3d(It+2/At+2)
+ b4Dt/At + b5d(Dt/At) + b6d(Dt+2/At+2)
+ c1dVt+2/At + et  (2)
The  difference  between  (1)  and (2)  is  the  way change  in  dividends  and  interest-
expense is measured. In (2), it is the level, not the amount, that is regressed against  
excess value. d(Dt / At ) = Dt / At - Dt-2 / At-2  is a proxy for the change in dividend 
policy.  Although,  according  to  Lintner,  1956,  D/E  would  be  a  better  measure  of 
dividend policy, this measure would not be consistent with the formula. dD t/At= (Dt– 
Dt-2)/At represents the absolute change in dividends, divided by assets.
Scaling  the  dividends  to  assets  can  lead  to  misrepresentation,  as  “difference  in 
leverage can also produce cross-firm variations in D/A” (Fama & French, 1998, p. 
824). Leverage must therefore be taken into account. Fama and French do this by 
including leverage in the regression. One way we could mitigate the leverage-effect, 
could be to scale the results to leverage. On the other hand, this would complicate the 
regression further.  Although we are not primarily  interested in the debt-effect,  we 
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include it in our regressions for two reasons. First of all, to avoid that leverage clouds 
the  effect  of  dividends  in  our  regressions,  and  secondly,  in  order  to  maintain 
consistency with Fama & French, 1998.
Regressions (3) and (4) give information about the change in value, in relation to the 
change in the variables. Said another way, how much value is created by changing the 
variables (adding another dollar of R&D, dividend etc.). It is disputable whether value 
is  created,  as Miller  and Modigliani  would argue that  no value is  created through 
financing decisions. On the other hand, value is created by allocating resources to 
where they are more needed, or yield a higher risk/return. Viewed in this way, one 
could argue that increasing dividends to investors, who then can invest these funds 
better than the firm can, will increase value. This is in line with  Jensen, 1986, and 
adds to the theoretical basis for our hypothesis that a positive change in dividends will 
produce a positive change in value. 
d(Vt – At)/At = a + a1dEt/At + a2dEt+2/At 
+ a3dAt/At + a4dAt+2/At
+ a5dRDt/At + a6dRDt+2/at
+ b1It/At + b2dIt/At + b3dIt+2/At
+ b4Dt/At + b5dDt/At + b6dDt+2/A
+ c1dVt+2/At + et (3)
Likewise, the change in dividend-policy is expected to produce a positive change in 
value, in line with signalling-theory. Fama and French notes that D/A is a noisy proxy 
for dividend policy, but nevertheless the best one available. Conventionally, D/E is 
the usual measure for dividend policy (Lintner, 1956). And changes in assets would in 
our  regression  be  perceived  as  a  change  in  dividend-policy.  However,  as  the 
dependent variable is also scaled to assets, and D/A is a direct measure of return on 
assets  (dividends  on assets),  d(D/A)  is  a  good enough approximation  to  dividend 
policy. The fourth regression is:
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d(Vt – At)/At = a + a1dEt/At + a2dEt+2/At 
+ a3dAt/At + a4dAt+2/At
+ a5dRDt/At + a6dRDt+2/at
+ b1d(It/At) + b3d(It+2/At+2)
+ b4d(Dt/At) + b6d(Dt+2/At+2)
+ c1dVt+2/At + et (4)
Data selection
As Fama and French, we use data from the Compustat database, provided by Wharton 
Research  Data  Services.  More  specifically,  we  used  the  “North  America 
Fundamentals  Annual” which includes  both accounting  details  and fiscal  year-end 
stock data. 
Replicating  Fama  &  French,  1998,  we  use  data  for  all  publicly  listed  American 
industrial companies in the Compustat database, publishing annual financial reports 
between January 1963 and December 2010 (Fama and French: 1963-1992). This data 
set  includes  accounting  values  for  variables  such  as  total  assets,  debt,  interest 
payments,  dividend  payments,  earnings,  research  and  development  costs  and 
advertising costs, in addition to (fiscal) year-end closing price and number of stocks 
on issue.
Fama and French use Compustat variable 199, which is common stock closing price 
at the end of the fiscal year and Compustat variable 54, shares outstanding at fiscal 
year end, to derive market value of common equity. We do the same, but we believe 
that this choice deserves some consideration. When matching price data to accounting 
data, the timing of the stock-prices is important. Since we use fiscal year-end data, the 
annual  report  will  not  have  been  published.  We  believe,  however,  that  the  most 
important parts of the information in the annual reports are already public, as firms 
will  have  published  three  quarterly  reports  and  provided  guiding  to  analysts. 
Professional investors read quarterly reports and make assumptions and predictions to 
arrive at expectations for the performance of companies for the year. Hence, it is a fair 
assumption that most of the information from the annual report is known at the time 
of fiscal year expiry. Since the date of annual report publication is not available in the 
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database, the other approach would be to assume that all financial reports would have 
been published at least three months after fiscal year end. However, the stock price 
three months after fiscal year end would also include new information from events 
happening after fiscal year end. Therefore, we believe that matching accounting data 
with stock data three months later, would be less preferable.
In line with Fama and French (1998), for a company to be included in year t, it must 
have all the relevant data for year t, t+2 and t-2 (5 years). This means that the data line 
must contain a number, otherwise it is discarded. Obviously, this leads to a lot of data 
being discarded. But we rather want that, than to use incomplete data. For example, 
many companies list nothing (blank) in dividends. It is not feasible for us to find out if 
this means that the company paid out no dividends, or that it did not report it. The 
method for selecting the data also means that a company must have filed reports for at 
least  three  years  before  it  can  be  counted.  Fama and  French  note  that  there  is  a 
possibility of a survivor-bias, but that it would be much worse if we ran a time-series 
regression instead. This is of course true. Adding to this, we believe that when we are 
working  with  such  large  aggregates,  it  can  be  an  advantage  that  a  company  has 
existed for some time before it is counted in the data. This way we may avoid some 
outliers that otherwise might have had a disproportionate impact on the results.
The average number of included companies (data-lines) per year is 2,655 between the 
years of 1965 and 1992, and 3,177 between the years of 1965 to 2008, ranging from 
634 in 1965 to 4,463 in 2002. After 2002, the number of companies decline to 3,647 
in 2008. A total  of 139,805 data-lines are included, while 111,784 data-lines were 
dropped due to missing variables. 80,685 of these were dropped because of missing 
information  about  share-price  and number  of  shares.  We suspect  these  to  include 
many unlisted firms, and do not think that our data-set loses much value because of 
this. The number of variables (in the regressions) for each formula vary from 11 to 15, 
while these again are based on data from a number of other variables (in  Compustat).  
See page 19 and the file Variable Descriptions from Wharton.pdf in the enclosed files 
for further details.
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Calculating variables from the data-set
We follow the procedure of  Fama & French, 1998, to calculate the variables.  The 
codes  have changed names  since  they  wrote  their  article,  but  Wharton/Compustat 
provides a list of keys so that we are positive that we use the same variables (see 
appendix  A.6).  Most  of  the  variables  used  in  the  regression  are  calculated  from 
several  other  variables,  and we will  now go through  how each  of  the  regression 
variables are calculated (Wharton/Compustat code in parenthesis): 
● V, value, is the product of the number of common shares (CSHPRI) and the 
closing price at the end of the fiscal year (PRCC_F), plus preferred stock taken 
in  the order of availability:  redemption  value (PSTKRV), liquidating  value 
(PSTKL), or carrying value (PSTK), plus total liabilities (LT). 
● A, assets is total assets (AT). 
● E, earnings, is income before extraordinary items (IB), plus interest expense 
(XINT), plus, when available,  deferred taxes income account (TXDI),  and 
investment tax credit income account (ITCI).
● RD, Research and Development (XRD).
● I, interest expense (XINT).
● D, dividends common (DVC).
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Differences between our data and Fama and French (1998)
Means and Standard Deviations of the Regression Variables 1965-1992:
GN12 Mean GN12 Stdev FF98 Mean FF98 Stdev
(V0-A0)/A0 0.337 0.804 0.350 0.835
E0/A0 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.065
dE0/A0 0.012 0.074 0.013 0.066
dE+2/A0 0.017 0.087 0.019 0.082
dA0/A0 0.156 0.240 0.170 0.222
dA+2/A0 0.230 0.390 0.255 0.392
RD0/A0 0.013 0.028 0.013 0.028
dRD0/A0 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.013
dRD+2/A0 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.018
I0/A0 0.024 0.017 0.021 0.017
dI0/A0 0.004 0.014 0.004 0.012
dI+2/A0 0.006 0.018 0.006 0.017
D0/A0 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.018
dD0/A0 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008
dD+2/A0 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.009
d(I0/A0) 0.002 0.012 0.001 0.011
d(I+2/A+2) 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.011
d(D0/A0) 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.008
d(D+2/A+2) 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.008
dV+2/A0 0.316 0.936 0.371 1.004
GN12 : Gregersen & Nielsen, 2012 FF98 : Fama & French, 1998
Processing data
The sheer amount of data needed to run these regressions are daunting. None of the 
programs available to us, like MiniTAB and SPSS, are able to process the data in any 
effective way. The cross-sectional regression method requires that the data is sorted 
on years, so that regressions can be run year-by-year. Sorting the data manually is just 
not possible within a practical time-frame. Another problem for standard statistics 
programs is the trimming. While it is possible to trim in Minitab, it is only possible to 
do so one variable at the time. As explained further down, this would cause us to lose 
far too many variables, and would not be in line with the methods of Fama and 
French. MiniTAB and SPSS adjusts the input data to account for certain statistics, 
such as auto-correlation, which is feasible for time series regressions, but probably not 
optimal for running our cross sectional regressions. The closed source code nature of 
MiniTAB and SPSS makes it difficult or impossible for us to know exactly what 
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adjustments they make. The only way Fama and French, account for potential auto-
correlation in the two year change variables is by requiring a higher T-statistic for 
significance (Fama & French, 1998, p. 826). Therefore, we should not adjust the cross 
sectional data sets before solving the regression equations.
Next  we  will  explain  the  basic  functions  of  our  program.  The  full  code  for  the 
program is provided on the enclosed disc in line with open-source principles.
The  program  works  in  the  following  way.  It  reads  tab-separated  text  data  files, 
optionally  compressed  using  a  lossless  GZip  routine.  First  we  load  the  data  file 
downloaded from the Compustat database. Then we can load the data file from the 
CRSP data, so that the program could use CRSP price and number of shares data for 
the fiscal year end month if this information is not available in the Compustat file. 
However,  adding CRSP data  only leads  to  an increase  of  about  18 companies  in 
average per year over the 44 year period from 1965 to 2008. Since adding data from 
CRSP does not add much to the data set, and Fama and French used only Compustat  
data,  we decided  to  only  use  COMPSTAT data  as  well.  However,  the  option  to 
include price data from CRSP could be useful for later research.
Next,  we had to  process  the  data  and calculate  the  right  variables  for  use  in  the 
regressions, see page 19 for a list of the variables. We scaled these variables to assets, 
see  page  14 for  explanation.  We  also  excluded  observations  not  containing  all 
necessary data, explanation is found on page 18.
Because the variables are scaled to assets, which is an issue if assets are zero or close 
to zero, Fama and French  drop 0.5 per cent of the observations in each tail of the  
distribution of each explanatory variable, (Fama & French, 1998, p. 826), in order to 
avoid data errors and extremely influential observations. We do the same, and trim the 
0.5 per cent tails in both ends of the data for each variable based on the full data set 
for each year. By trimming each variable based on the full data set, we loose less than 
n percent of the data for n variables, as the the same company can be an extreme 
observation for more than one variable. When trimming the all Compustat firms data, 
we loose on average 7.4 per cent of the data per year for formula 1 and 2 and on 
average 6.2 per cent of the data for formula 3 and 4. Even after trimming, there are 
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some extreme-values left in the data-set. These are typically assets=0. When scaling 
to assets, this sometimes result in the observed value of the scaled variables to be 
0/”0” or infinity. This would lead to an invalid or singular data matrix, which would 
lead to none or infinite solutions to the regression equations. Therefore, companies 
with  such observed values  in  any variable  included in  the  regression formula  are 
removed  before  the  program calculates  the  coefficients.  Fama and French do not 
report that they have encountered this problem after trimming. We believe that this 
might be explained by the fact that our data-set includes firms that are not included in 
their data-set, because of the  updates that have taken place over the years since they 
collected  their  data,  see  the  appendix  A.3  for  our  e-mail  correspondence  with 
Compustat and Wharton. It is also possible that they had this problem, but failed to 
report it  because their statistical software automatically discarded observations that 
divided over zero (we know that Minitab does this). However, we cannot know for 
sure, since we do not know what software Fama and French used.
Fama and French note that the difference in capitalization rates might obscure the 
data. They solve this by sorting the companies according to size (fifty - fifty)  and 
book-to-market ratio (30 - 40 - 30 per cent). They find that while there are differences  
between the groups, they are not big enough to report.
We  have  nevertheless  embedded  the  option  to  split  the  data  after  trimming  into 
smaller  data sets  based on Fama and French’s SMB and/or HML percentiles,  and 
dividend payers and non dividend payers. We have defined non dividend payers as 
companies for which Dt/At and dDt/At is zero for formula 1 and 3, and companies for 
which Dt/At and d(Dt/At) is zero for formulas 2 and 4, since this  is the dividend 
information that would be available at time t.
Regression
Finally, we run the regressions. Our program does an ordinary least squares regression 
for each year and calculates the mean of each coefficient, a corresponding standard 
error  and  T-statistic,  in  correspondence  with  the  Fama/MacBeth  (1973)  method, 
formulas (2) and (3).
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The regression equation we used for calculating the coefficients of each cross-section 
is the following.
(1) AT Aβ=AT y
Where AT is the m x n matrix of data observations.  m is the number of independent 
variables and n is the number of observations. AT is the transpose of A, and vice versa. 
β is an  m x 1 vector of the unknown coefficients.  y is an  n x 1 vector of response 
variable observations. This is basically a set of m linear equations of  m unknowns, 
that minimize the least squares fit problem.
(2)
SE i=
∑
t=0
n
(βi , t−β̄i)
2
√n√n−1
where t is the time index and i is the coefficient index.
(3) T i=
β̄i
SE i
Further, we used the method of  Fama & MacBeth, 1973, calculated the average of 
each  annual  cross-sectional  coefficient.  Calculated  a  standard  error  (2)  for  each 
coefficient as the standard deviation of the annual cross-sectional coefficients, divided 
by the square root of the number of cross-sections. The Fama/MacBeth T-statistic (3) 
is  not  equal  to  a  student  t-statistic.  It  is  similar  in  nature  though,  as  it  conveys 
information  about  the  probability  (or  improbability)  of  the  correctness  of  the null 
hypothesis;  that  the mean of the cross-sectional  coefficients is 0. We consider the 
calculated mean of the coefficient to be significant if the Fama/MacBeth T-statistic is 
above a  certain  threshold.  In  this  case  we relay  on  the  calculations  of  Fama and 
French and require an absolute t-value close to 3.0 or more (Fama & French, 1998, p. 
826).  The Fama/MacBeth  T-statistic  is  the mean of  the  cross-sectional  coefficient 
divided by the corresponding Fama/MacBeth standard error of that coefficient.
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RESULTS
We present our results in the following order. First, we compare our results with that 
of Fama and French (1998), from the same time period, 1965-1992. The point is to 
show that  we  are  able  to  re-create  their  results  and  thereby  prove  that  we  have 
followed the same method they used. Then we expand the time-period to include the 
years up until 2008. Due to the construction of the regression formula, this is as far as 
we have data. These regressions are run on all Compustat firms, which include all 
firms reporting in USD listed on any major North American exchange as well as over 
the counter and pink sheet listings with available market valuation data. To provide a 
check  for  differences  in  liquidity  or  any  other  attributes,  we  also  run  a  set  of 
regressions only on firms that are listed on the major exchanges: NYSE, NASDAQ 
and AMEX. In order to explain the behavior of the coefficients, we also include some 
descriptive statistics on earnings and dividends, based on the same  data material.
All Compustat Firms 1965-1992
We are by and large able to reproduce the results of Fama and French (1998). Our 
results differ a little, but we attribute this to the changes that have been made in the 
data-material since 1995, when Fama and French extracted their data. According to 
Standard and Poor Capital IQ, who are responsible for the Compustat database, the 
data  have  been  expanded  over  the  years,  as  more  data  has  been  made  available 
through IPOs and mergers (see also correspondence with Standard and Poor in the 
appendix A.3). It is also possible that differences, such as how many decimals the 
statistical software that was used by Fama & French, 1998, were able to handle and 
store during and between calculations, could produce some differences in the results.
Each regression is listed and commented on below. For every regression we list the 
variables with its means (average coefficient for the years 1965-1992) and the Fama-
Macbeth  T-values  (FM T).  For  comparison  the  corresponding  results  of  Fama &
French, 1998, FF98, are listed next to our results; Gregersen & Nielsen (2012), GN12. 
Significant coefficients are highlighted in bold types.
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All Compustat Firms, formula 1, 1965-1992:
GN12 FF98 GN12 FF98
(V0-A0)/A0 Mean Mean FM T FM T
Const -0.23 -0.17 -2.46 -2.82
E0/A0 2.20 1.8 2.15 2.61
dE0/A0 0.17 0.43 0.53 2.43
dE+2/A0 0.67 0.8 3.10 3.08
dA0/A0 0.64 0.66 8.84 12.21
dA+2/A0 0.48 0.45 5.40 5.48
RD0/A0 4.44 4.29 9.11 7.24
dRD0/A0 1.46 4.3 1.72 3.74
dRD+2/A0 5.03 5.66 5.21 6.86
I0/A0 1.13 -1.17 1.02 -1.54
dI0/A0 -4.64 -4.21 -3.65 -5.94
dI+2/A0 -3.77 -4.57 -4.48 -5.24
D0/A0 4.04 4.22 5.35 5.42
dD0/A0 5.48 6.63 5.81 6.08
dD+2/A0 7.77 8.1 9.81 9.98
dV+2/A0 -0.18 -0.16 -3.05 -2.62
GN12 : Gregersen & Nielsen, 2012 FF98 : Fama & French, 1998
The positive effect of dividends on value is  prevalent  here as in  Fama & French,
1998. All dividend coefficients are more than 5 standard-errors from zero. We were 
surprised to find a positive value on interest (I/A), but the coefficient is not significant 
neither in our results nor the results of Fama & French, 1998. We require a T-value of 
+/-  3  or  more.  A closer  look at  the regressions  for  each year,  reveal  a very high 
coefficient for I0/A0 in ‘65 and ‘66, which have a large impact on the average (all  
years are listed in the appendix). The average I/A coefficient for the years 1967 to 
1992  is  -0.22.  For  most  of  the  seventies  the  coefficient  is  positive,  while  in  the 
eighties mostly negative. This is reflected in the rather high standard error and low T-
values (see appendix A.4 for more detail). The other interest-variables are in line with 
Fama & French, 1998. dVt+2/At  is significant in our regressions. This means that the 
variable is able to capture the effect of unexpected changes in the future variables. 
All the dividend variables are significant and positive.
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Formula 2, all Compustat firms 1965-1992:
GN12 FF98 GN12 FF98
(V0-A0)/A0 Mean Mean FM T FM T
Const -0.22 -0.16 -2.36 -2.56
E0/A0 2.65 2.29 2.56 3.18
dE0/A0 0.37 0.76 1.25 4.48
dE+2/A0 0.89 1.16 3.87 4.14
dA0/A0 0.48 0.54 8.27 10.04
dA+2/A0 0.40 0.36 4.91 4.9
RD0/A0 4.31 4.12 8.62 6.72
dRD0/A0 1.85 4.8 2.14 3.98
dRD+2/A0 5.16 5.7 5.64 6.82
I0/A0 -0.45 -3.36 -0.35 -3.58
d(I0/A0) 0.34 0.11 0.39 0.16
d(I+2/A+2) -0.03 -2.17 -0.04 -2.19
D0/A0 5.27 5.92 6.36 8.4
d(D0/A0) 2.03 2.62 2.66 3.26
d(D+2/A+2) 4.78 5.66 4.82 5.38
dV+2/A0 -0.17 -0.15 -2.75 -2.49
GN12 : Gregersen & Nielsen, 2012 FF98 : Fama & French, 1998
There are some discrepancies compared to  Fama & French, 1998, most notably in 
dRD0/A0 and d(I0/A0), and as in formula 1, I0/A0. However, the interest variables 
are not significant in our results, meaning there is no basis in the regression results to 
claim that interest or change in debt policy has an impact on value, which is more in 
line with  Miller  & Modigliani,  1961.  The dividend-variables  are  strong,  however, 
ranging from 2.66 to  6.36 standard-errors from zero.  The regression confirms the 
strong positive effect a positive change in the dividend-ratio has on value. What is 
even more interesting is the positive effect a future change in the dividend-ratio has 
on value.  According to  Fama & French, 1998, this  can be attributed to investor’s 
predictions  about  the  future  prospects  of  a  firm.  In other  words,  a  firm which  is 
expected to increase its dividend-ratio in the future, has a higher value-to-assets than 
other firms (all else equal). Another way of looking at it would of course be that a 
profitable firm is expected to increase its dividend ratio. 
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Formula 3, all Compustat firms 1965-1992:
GN12 FF98 GN12 FF98
d(V0-A0)/A0 Mean Mean FM T FM T
Const -0.11 -0.13 -4.11 -5
dE0/A0 3.05 3.46 4.73 6.85
dE+2/A0 0.84 0.83 4.61 5.05
dA0/A0 0.20 0.16 2.67 1.79
dA+2/A0 0.28 0.34 4.43 5.11
dRD0/A0 2.96 2.69 3.06 2.33
dRD+2/A0 1.37 2.96 2.27 3.72
dI0/A0 -4.95 -6.16 -4.16 -5.1
dI+2/A0 -0.84 -2.13 -1.24 -2.55
dD0/A0 2.25 3.29 2.22 2.68
dD+2/A0 3.86 4.9 5.44 4.42
dV+2/A0 -0.14 -0.14 -3.46 -3.53
GN12 : Gregersen & Nielsen, 2012 FF98 : Fama & French, 1998
Formula 3 and 4 regress the effect on the two year change in value to assets. Our 
results are in line with Fama & French, 1998, although we have lower coefficients on 
some of  the  variables.  Both  the  increase  and the  anticipatory  increase  is  strongly 
positive and respectively 2.22 and 5.44 standard-errors from zero. The fact that the 
expected future increase in dividends is more significant than the historical increase in 
dividends, is in line with Lintner's theory of lagged dividend policies, in the way that 
future  dividends  are  more  correlated  with  today’s  profitability  than  historical 
dividends.
Formula 4, all Compustat firms 1965-1992:
GN12 FF98 GN12 FF98
d(V0-A0)/A0 Mean Mean FM T FM T
Const -0.10 -0.11 -3.33 -3.44
dE0/A0 3.40 4.13 4.80 6.13
dE+2/A0 0.95 1.11 5.10 4.75
dA0/A0 0.07 0 1.24 0.03
dA+2/A0 0.25 0.27 4.40 4.89
dRD0/A0 3.27 3.77 3.13 2.66
dRD+2/A0 1.58 3.08 2.44 3.92
d(I0/A0) -3.56 -5.88 -4.11 -4.66
d(I+2/A+2) 0.60 -0.6 1.17 -0.54
d(D0/A0) 1.79 2.29 2.74 2.31
d(D+2/A+2) 1.19 0.05 1.51 0.04
dV+2/A0 -0.13 -0.14 -3.14 -3.26
GN12 : Gregersen & Nielsen, 2012 FF98 : Fama & French, 1998
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The change in dividend-policy,  d(D0/A0),  comes out  more significant,  but  with a 
slightly lower coefficient than Fama & French, 1998. Both in their and in our results, 
the  backward-looking  change,  d(D0/A0)  is  in  the  borderline  of  being  significant, 
while the forward-looking variable, d(D+2/A+2) is not significant in neither our nor 
the Fama & French, 1998, results . The other variables are more or less in line with 
Fama & French,  1998.  The d(I+2/A+2) variable  has  opposite  signs,  however  this 
coefficient is not significant neither in the results of Fama & French, 1998, nor in our 
results, hence it is likely that this coefficient should really be zero. Theoretically, that 
is in line with Miller & Modigliani, 1961, that increasing debt should not create value. 
However,  we  see  a  significant  dis-advantage  for  the  historical  increase  in  debt 
variable,  which is  not in  line with tax shield theory.  This is  a sign that  historical 
increase in debt is generally viewed as a sign of distress over a sign that management 
is trying to exploit tax shields. In that light, it is possible that an historical increase in 
dividends represents opposite, positive, signals about management's beliefs for future 
profitability.  However,  as  previously mentioned,  the historical  change in  dividend 
policy is just on the borderline of being significant.
All Compustat Firms 1965-2008
We have in the previous chapter shown that we are able to run the same regressions as 
Fama and French did. There were some differences in the results, due to updates of 
the data material done by Standard and Poor Capital IQ, but overall, the regressions 
yielded the same results. Next, we will extend the time-period to see if the pattern is 
the same for the whole period 1965-2008. 2008 is as far as we can run the regressions, 
since we require t=0,+/-2, and 2010 is the last year we have complete annual data for. 
As well  as running the full  regressions, we will  also run regressions on the time-
period 1993-2008, in order to identify the impact the new data has on the results. A 
time-period of 15 years is not much in relation to the amount of data we have, but we 
believe it is useful at least for illustrative purposes.
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Formula 1, all Compustat firms 1965-2008:
(V0-A0)/A0 65-08 Mean T 65-92 Mean T 93-08 Mean T
Const -0.03 -0.38 -0.23 -2.46 0.32 4.83
E0/A0 0.71 0.98 2.20 2.15 -1.88 -4.04
dE0/A0 0.38 1.83 0.17 0.53 0.76 4.61
dE+2/A0 0.34 2.02 0.67 3.10 -0.23 -1.10
dA0/A0 0.54 7.70 0.64 8.84 0.36 2.64
dA+2/A0 0.42 3.79 0.48 5.40 0.31 1.18
RD0/A0 4.54 11.79 4.44 9.11 4.71 7.30
dRD0/A0 1.10 1.85 1.46 1.72 0.46 0.68
dRD+2/A0 4.51 6.81 5.03 5.21 3.59 5.49
I0/A0 2.67 2.33 1.13 1.02 5.35 2.25
dI0/A0 -4.88 -5.02 -4.64 -3.65 -5.30 -3.48
dI+2/A0 -2.50 -3.50 -3.77 -4.48 -0.27 -0.24
D0/A0 5.97 8.68 4.04 5.35 9.35 10.86
dD0/A0 3.46 4.61 5.48 5.81 -0.08 -0.15
dD+2/A0 6.13 8.49 7.77 9.81 3.26 2.89
dV+2/A0 -0.15 -2.52 -0.18 -3.05 -0.09 -0.72
Some  of  the  coefficients  change  dramatically  when  we  extend  the  time-period. 
Earnings  are  no  longer  significant,  which  is  very  counter-intuitive.  For  the  time-
period  93-08,  E0/A0  is  significantly  negative,  although  changes  in  earnings  are 
positive.  On  the  other  hand,  dividend-coefficients  are  strong,  with  D0/A0  10.86 
standard-errors from zero (5.35 in 1965-1992). RD/A0 is 11.79 standard-errors from 
zero, compared to 9.11 in the data-set that ran from 1965-1992. The future change in 
R&D is also stronger here than in the period 65-92. Earnings to assets takes a dive in 
the time-period 1993-2008. We attribute this to the increase in the price-to-book ratio, 
which is  strongly connected to our dependent  variable,  and price-to-earnings.  The 
development in the average V/E-ratio serves to illustrate the point:
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The  V/E  ratio  is  based  on  the  same  data  as  we  have  used  for  our  regressions. 
However,  we have  used  a  simplified  approach,  where  we have  divided the  mean 
market value of equity and debt over mean earnings (before interest-payments, but 
after tax). This is not the same as average V/E, but it is a close approximation and 
illustrate well the development in the ratio over the time-period. The ratio has been 
climbing since a low of 10 in 1981, but what is even more important to the impact on 
our data, is the rise from 23 in 1994 to 50 in 2001. Although it dropped after that, we 
believe this explains the negative coefficient on earnings in the period 1993-2008.
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Formula 2, all Compustat firms 1965-2008:
65-08 93-08
(V0-A0)/A0 Mean SE T Mean SE T
Const -0.06 0.08 -0.70 0.23 0.12 1.92
E0/A0 0.91 0.76 1.19 -2.15 0.46 -4.64
dE0/A0 0.61 0.20 3.06 1.04 0.15 7.01
dE+2/A0 0.47 0.18 2.57 -0.25 0.21 -1.17
dA0/A0 0.37 0.05 6.86 0.19 0.09 1.96
dA+2/A0 0.36 0.09 3.91 0.29 0.21 1.36
RD0/A0 4.41 0.48 9.23 4.59 1.00 4.57
dRD0/A0 1.79 0.66 2.71 1.67 1.03 1.62
dRD+2/A0 4.62 0.65 7.11 3.68 0.78 4.74
I0/A0 1.91 1.48 1.30 6.04 3.17 1.90
d(I0/A0) -1.61 1.32 -1.22 -5.01 3.17 -1.58
d(I+2/A+2) 0.10 0.59 0.17 0.33 0.57 0.58
D0/A0 7.56 0.81 9.33 11.58 1.15 10.06
d(D0/A0) 1.24 0.53 2.33 -0.13 0.45 -0.29
d(D+2/A+2) 4.01 0.88 4.57 2.67 1.67 1.59
dV+2/A0 -0.14 0.06 -2.31 -0.08 0.13 -0.65
The change in dividend-ratio loses significance when we extend the data-set. For the 
period 1993-2008, the coefficient is negative (but again, not significant), albeit the 
D0/A0 is even stronger. In other words, the dividend premium is larger for the time-
period 1965-2008, than it was in 1965-1992.
Formula 3,  all Compustat firms 1965-2008:
65-08 93-08
d(V0-A0)/A0 Mean SE T Mean SE T
Const -0.10 0.04 -2.27 -0.09 0.12 -0.76
dE0/A0 1.51 0.61 2.47 -1.18 0.94 -1.26
dE+2/A0 0.41 0.17 2.47 -0.33 0.24 -1.36
dA0/A0 0.34 0.07 4.66 0.58 0.13 4.36
dA+2/A0 0.23 0.09 2.65 0.16 0.22 0.71
dRD0/A0 2.54 0.73 3.46 1.80 1.11 1.62
dRD+2/A0 2.25 0.58 3.89 3.80 1.11 3.41
dI0/A0 -4.30 0.99 -4.33 -3.17 1.79 -1.77
dI+2/A0 -1.10 0.54 -2.04 -1.55 0.91 -1.70
dD0/A0 1.99 0.69 2.89 1.52 0.66 2.29
dD+2/A0 3.42 0.57 6.01 2.64 0.95 2.79
dV+2/A0 -0.13 0.04 -3.36 -0.11 0.08 -1.37
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The results from  Fama & French, 1998 are robust and holds when we extend the 
period  to  2008.  The  only  large  change  is  in  the  earnings-variable,  which  was 
discussed above. The t-value of 2.47 comes short of our hurdle of 3, but it is not a too 
far  stretch  to  say  that  this  implies  that  changes  in  earnings  explain  some of  the 
changes in value. But the link is weak. The dividend-variables are slightly stronger 
here than in  the 65-92 data-set,  and we are tempted  to  declare  the dD0/A0 slope 
significant. There is no doubt, however, that the future change in dividend pay-out 
does a far better job at explaining past change in value to assets.
Formula 4, all Compustat firms 1965-2008:
65-08 93-08
d(V0-A0)/A0 Mean SE T Mean SE T
Const -0.09 0.05 -1.84 -0.07 0.12 -0.57
dE0/A0 1.62 0.70 2.30 -1.49 1.15 -1.30
dE+2/A0 0.48 0.18 2.71 -0.33 0.27 -1.24
dA0/A0 0.25 0.07 3.31 0.55 0.15 3.62
dA+2/A0 0.22 0.06 3.59 0.17 0.14 1.22
dRD0/A0 2.70 0.82 3.28 1.71 1.34 1.27
dRD+2/A0 2.21 0.69 3.22 3.32 1.51 2.20
d(I0/A0) -3.77 0.75 -5.01 -4.13 1.44 -2.87
d(I+2/A+2) -0.12 0.70 -0.18 -1.38 1.68 -0.82
d(D0/A0) 1.61 0.47 3.42 1.30 0.63 2.06
d(D+2/A+2) 1.21 0.83 1.46 1.24 1.86 0.67
dV+2/A0 -0.12 0.04 -3.07 -0.11 0.08 -1.28
There are not many changes here. We can see that, as was the case for the time-period 
65-92, past changes in dividend ratios are significant, while future changes are not. 
Earnings are no longer significant, while dA0/A0 is significant here, which it was not 
in 65-92. The same applies for dRD+2/A0.
After extending the data Fama and French used for their paper to 2008, we conclude 
that their findings still hold true. Dividends carry information about profitability that 
is  not  captured  by the other  variables,  and are positive.  Earnings  seem to be less 
significant in the latter years, and we believe this is connected to the increasing P/E-
ratios, particularly in the time-period leading up to the dot-com crash (1993-2001). 
Since the coefficients we use are averages for all years, such a time-period with that 
high ratios have a large impact on the means.
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NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX 1965-2008
We have so far walked in the steps of Fama and French, regressing all Compustat 
Firms. Since this data includes all firms that file the annual 10-K report, we suspect 
that some stocks with typically low liquidity can produce extreme values that have a 
dis-proportional impact on the regressions. We have therefore run a set of regressions 
on firms that are listed on the major exchanges: NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX. These 
stocks are traded more frequently and are followed by a large number of analysts. 
This increases the likelihood that their price reflects the expected value of their future 
cash-flows. The fact that the stocks are traded with high frequency, thus making them 
liquid, means that it is easier for an investor to sell his stocks without influencing the 
price too much.
In essence, the friction should be less for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks than 
for over the counter traded or non-listed stocks. A possible hypothesis is that investors 
would pay less interest in the dividend, since they could easily construct a home-made 
dividend by selling stock. This would be in line with the bird-in-the-hand fallacy. On 
the other hand, in signalling theory, the actual pay-out per se does not matter. It is the 
information contained in dividends that matter. Tax-effects are also different in such a 
market,  since  it  would  be  possible,  with  little  friction,  to  trade  away  the  tax 
disadvantage by selling and buying around the ex-date. The first theory would mean 
that the dividend-variables are less important in this data-set, the second means that 
we should see no change, and the latter implies that the dividend will be larger. There 
is no way for us to tell which effect is at work or has the highest influence. However, 
we can find the effects.
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We present the results of regressions 1 and 2, spread of value to assets, first:
Formula 1 Formula2
(V0-A0)/A0 Mean SE T (V0-A0)/A0 Mean SE T
Const -0.13 0.07 -1.74 Const -0.10 0.07 -1.40
E0/A0 3.10 0.61 5.12 E0/A0 3.59 0.63 5.75
dE0/A0 0.02 0.21 0.11 dE0/A0 0.11 0.20 0.55
dE+2/A0 1.20 0.15 8.22 dE+2/A0 1.34 0.16 8.40
dA0/A0 0.64 0.05 12.01 dA0/A0 0.49 0.04 11.16
dA+2/A0 0.41 0.06 6.34 dA+2/A0 0.32 0.06 5.33
RD0/A0 4.89 0.41 11.82 RD0/A0 4.82 0.42 11.47
dRD0/A0 1.88 0.47 4.03 dRD0/A0 2.10 0.47 4.47
dRD+2/A0 5.37 0.66 8.14 dRD+2/A0 5.83 0.79 7.39
I0/A0 -1.73 0.87 -2.00 I0/A0 -3.68 0.88 -4.16
dI0/A0 -5.26 0.84 -6.22 d(I0/A0) -0.04 0.59 -0.07
dI+2/A0 -4.64 0.59 -7.89 d(I+2/A+2) -1.21 0.61 -1.97
D0/A0 5.24 0.62 8.48 D0/A0 5.59 0.56 10.04
dD0/A0 3.22 0.81 3.98 d(D0/A0) 1.61 0.57 2.82
dD+2/A0 5.33 0.67 7.96 d(D+2/A+2) 4.37 0.69 6.33
dV+2/A0 -0.15 0.05 -3.14 dV+2/A0 -0.14 0.05 -2.92
Overall, the slopes and the t-values are higher (absolute values) in this data-set than 
all Compustat firms. This could be due to the fact that so many analysts and investors 
follow these stocks and the information requirement is very strict for listed firms. The 
biggest difference lies in the earnings variables. Here, both E0/A0 and dE+2/A0 are 
significant, which they were not in the data-set that included all Compustat firms. All 
interest-coefficients  are  negative.  The  dividend-variables  have  slightly  higher 
coefficients and t-values, which is consistent with signalling-theory.
Formula 3 Formula 4
d(V0-A0)/A0 Mean SE T d(V0-A0)/A0 Mean SE T
Const -0.10 0.02 -4.69 Const -0.09 0.02 -3.78
dE0/A0 2.98 0.44 6.73 dE0/A0 3.29 0.48 6.78
dE+2/A0 0.88 0.14 6.20 dE+2/A0 0.96 0.15 6.60
dA0/A0 0.34 0.06 5.62 dA0/A0 0.21 0.05 3.86
dA+2/A0 0.34 0.05 6.85 dA+2/A0 0.27 0.04 6.06
dRD0/A0 2.00 0.65 3.09 dRD0/A0 2.09 0.68 3.08
dRD+2/A0 2.66 0.48 5.57 dRD+2/A0 3.08 0.53 5.79
dI0/A0 -6.46 0.87 -7.42 d(I0/A0) -4.10 0.65 -6.33
dI+2/A0 -3.09 0.72 -4.32 d(I+2/A+2) -1.29 0.86 -1.50
dD0/A0 2.21 0.79 2.81 d(D0/A0) 2.40 0.59 4.06
dD+2/A0 3.32 0.62 5.39 d(D+2/A+2) 1.94 0.68 2.84
dV+2/A0 -0.14 0.03 -4.21 dV+2/A0 -0.13 0.03 -3.91
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The  same  picture  emerges  when  we  regress  the  change  in  value  to  assets,  the 
standard-errors  are  smaller  for  this  data-set  and  the  coefficients  are  more  evenly 
distributed  on  the  different  variables.  The earning-variables  are  positive  and even 
more  significant,  with  T-values  in  regressions  3  and  4  above  6.  This  is  a  large 
difference from the other data-set, where we showed that the relationship between 
increased earnings and increased value was weak at best. Here, they are strong and do 
a better job at explaining value than any of the other pair of variables. Despite strong 
earnings-variables, dividends still have explanatory power on the same level as in the 
other data-set: dD0/A0 and dD+2/A0 are slightly lower in this data-set, d(D0/A0) and 
d(D+2/A+2) are slightly higher. The conclusion is still that increased dividends are 
associated with increased value, both forward and backward-looking.
Characteristics of dividends in the data-set
Pay-out rate
We  have  proven  that  the  findings  of  Fama  &  French,  1998,  holds,  namely  that 
dividends  convey information  about  value  missed  by other  control  variables,  also 
when we extend the time-period to include the period 1993-2008. However, there is 
some discussion in the academia about the relevance of dividends. Most relevant to us 
is another article by Fama & French, 2001, Disappearing Dividends: changing firms  
characteristics or lower propensity to pay?, in which they show that the proportion of 
firms that pay dividends have been decreasing. There is no doubt that is true. We find 
the same in our data:
Number of dividend payers and non-payers 1965-2008
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Fama & French, 2001, found that this is due both to an increase in growth-firms, firms 
that re-invest rather than pay out dividends,  and lower propensity to pay even for 
firms  with  characteristics  that  previously  meant  that  they  would  pay  (large,  low 
growth and stable earnings). If this is true, why are dividends still significant? We 
believe it is because dividends are in fact not disappearing. Total dividends paid out 
have increased steadily through-out the period, but went down in 2008 following the 
crash of the sub-prime bubble, as the illustration below shows:
Total dividends paid out are in fact increasing, even when we adjust for inflation as 
we have done here. This does not necessarily mean that firms on average pay out 
more dividends,  the growth seen in the graph above could just  be a result  of the 
growth in the number of companies. It is therefore useful to look at total dividends 
paid out per firm per year:
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The previous graph illustrates how stable dividend pay-outs have been, on average. It 
was high in 1965. However, in 1965 the number of firms included in our data set is 
low, only 634. The later period from around 2003 to 2008 is more interesting, as we 
see how much pay-out increases. The tax-code changed in 2003, which resulted in the 
same tax-rates for dividends and capital gains alike, of 15 per cent. This might explain 
why the average paid out dividends increased after 2003, but it could also reflect the 
general growth in the economy. To see if this was the case, we have looked at the 
average dividend-ratio (dividends in per cent of earnings) for all the firms included in 
our data-set:
What is evident is that while dividends as a share of earnings declined from 1965 to 
the mid-seventies, the pay-out rate has been more or less stable between twenty and 
thirty per cent. This graph is based on average earnings over average dividends, so it 
represents the total pay-out rate on total earnings of all firms in the data-set. Since 
Fama & French, 2001, rely only on data from NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX, we also 
computed the ratio for only those firms. The pattern is the same, but the payout-ratio 
is a little higher overall for the firms listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX.
Our regressions are scaled to assets,  so it  is interesting to see the development in 
dividends to assets. This would not have much meaning without earnings to assets, so 
we have included both.
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Dividends and Earnings to Assets, 1965-2008
Both  direct  (dividends)  return  on  assets  (D/A)  and  return  on  assets  (E/A)  have 
declined and are low. It is hard to believe that returns can be this low, but we have 
also done the same exercise with firms listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX only. 
The  pattern  is  the  same,  declining  returns  over  time,  but  on  a  lower  level  with 
earnings to assets between 1-3 per cent. Again this is mean on mean, and return on 
assets is assigned to both equity and debt.
The point in our discussion, however, for the relevance of dividends, is that dividends 
are declining in relation to assets, but so are earnings. The declining cash dividends 
are  in  accordance  with  the  findings  of  Skinner,  2008,  that  stock  repurchases  are 
generally taking over for dividend payouts. However, that does not explain the same 
general development in earnings to assets.
Dividend Payers versus non Payers
We split the data set into Dividend Payers and Non Payers and trimmed each tail of 
the observed values of (V0-A0)/A0 by 0.5 per cent for each year. Non Payers did not 
pay dividends in the observed year and did not change their dividend payouts from 
two years before.
38
(V0-A0)/A0 1965 – 2008
Mean Full Population 1.438
Mean Dividend Payers 0.497
Mean Non Payers 1.988
Difference 1.491
Standard Error 0.489
T 3.049
As  this  simple  hypothesis  test  shows,  the  average  extra  value  over  assets  is 
significantly  higher  in  the  Non-Payers  population  than  in  the  Dividend  Payers 
population. The standard error is calculated based on the full population. This does 
however not say much about the effect dividends have on value, however it confirms 
that firms which do not pay dividends generally have higher valuation, most probably 
because firms with high growth opportunities generally do not pay dividends.
Dividend Payers 36.9 % Non Dividend Payers 63.1 %
The percentage of dividend payers has been decreasing steadily from  93.7 per cent in 
1965 to  29.4 per cent in 2002. From 2003 it has increased again to  40.1 per cent  
following the Bush administration tax equalization on dividend taxes and capital gains 
taxes.
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CONCLUSION
Dividends convey information about value that is not explained by other variables, 
such as earnings, investments and R&D. Fama and French proved this was true for the 
time-period 1965-1992, and we have confirmed that their results also hold when we 
extend  the  period  to  1965-2008.  The  conclusion  is  the  same if  we run  the  same 
regressions  on firms listed  on NYSE,  NASDAQ, AMEX only.  Dividends are  not 
disappearing, as the amount of dividends paid out increase steadily. The number of 
firms that did not pay out dividends were twice that of payers in the year 2000, but 
this number has since declined to 2000 non-payers and 1500 payers.
There is a tendency to smooth dividends over time. We found that the dividends for 
the previous year does a better job of explaining current dividends than this years 
earnings.  However,  the  Lintner  regression  (Appendix  A.2)  also  revealed  large 
deviations around times with high growth and a positive change in the dividend-tax. 
We conclude that there are tax-effects in dividends, but the positive effect on value 
should matter more than the negative effect of taxes.
FURTHER RESEARCH
The ability to process vast amounts of data opens up possibilities for further research. 
One avenue of  approach  that  we have  not  found place  for  here  is  to  regress  the 
different  listings  (NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX or other)  separately.  Further,  running 
regressions on different sectors or industries might reveal more, or less, explanatory 
power of dividends in different sectors. These regressions require a large data-set to 
have explanatory power, so it might prove difficult to find any significance in smaller 
markets such as the Norwegian. But larger markets, might prove interesting. We did 
find one paper that applied the same cross-sectional method on the German market 
(Nowak, 1998). As mentioned in the literature-review, we considered including share 
buy-backs  in  our  regressions.  Although  the  characteristics  of  buy-backs  are  very 
different  from  dividends,  they  might  contain  information  at  the  levels  found  for 
dividends. The Compustat database provide information on treasury stocks on at least 
40
an annual basis, and with the computer program we have constructed for our research, 
it should be a manageable task to extract the necessary data and do regressions.
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) was used in preparing this master thesis. 
This service and the data available thereon constitute valuable intellectual property 
and trade secrets of WRDS and/or its third-party suppliers.
41
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAKER, H KENT (2009)  Dividends and Dividend Policy (1. ed)  John Wiley & Sons,  
Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey. ISBN 978-0470455807
BAKER,  H  KENT,  GAIL E  FARRELLY &  RICHARD B  EDELMAN (1985)  A  survey  of 
management  views  on  dividend  policy  Financial  Management,  14(3)  pp.  78-84 
Published  by  Financial  Management  Association  International
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3665062
BAKER, H KENT, GARY E POWELL & E THEODORE VEIT (2002) Revisiting the dividend 
puzzle: do all of the pieces now fit? Review of Financial Economics, 11(4) pp. 241-
261 Published by University of New Orleans http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1058-
3300(02)00044-7
Benrud,  Erik  (2009).  The  historical  evolution  of  dividends.  In  Baker,  H  (Ed.), 
Dividends and dividend policy (Chapter 2) John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New 
Jersey. ISBN 978-0470455807
BLACK, FISCHER (1976) The dividend puzzle Journal of Portfolio Management, 2(2) pp. 
5-8 Published by Institutional Investor, Inc. http://www.iijournals.com/toc/jpm/2/2
EASTERBROOK, FRANK H (1984) Two agency-cost explanations of dividends  American 
Economic Review, 74(4) pp. 650-659 Published by American Economic Associtation
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1805130
ELTON,  EDWIN J & MARTIN J GRUBER (1970) Marginal stockholder tax rates and the 
clientele effect Review of Economics and Statistics, 52(1) pp. 68-74 Published by The 
MIT Press http://www.jstor.org/stable/1927599
FAMA, EUGENE F (1990) Stock returns, expected returns, and real activity  Journal of  
Finance,  45(4)  pp.  1089-1108  Published  by  American  Finance  Association
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2328716
FAMA, EUGENE F & JAMES D MACBETH (1973) Risk, return, and equilibrium: empirical 
tests Journal of Political Economy, 81(3) pp. 607-636 Published by The University of 
Chicago Press http://www.jstor.org/stable/1831028
42
FAMA,  EUGENE F & KENNETH R FRENCH (1998) Taxes, financing decisions,  and firm 
value  Journal  of  Finance,  53(3)  pp.  819-843  Published  by  American  Finance 
Association http://www.jstor.org/stable/117379
FAMA, EUGENE F & KENNETH R FRENCH (2001) Disappearing dividends: changing firm 
characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics, 60(1) pp. 
3-43 Published by University of Rochester http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-
405X(01)00038-1
FAMA,  EUGENE F  & KENNETH R FRENCH (2002)  Testing  trade-off  and pecking order 
predictions  about  dividends  and debt  Review of  Financial  Studies,  15(1)  pp.  1-33 
Published by Oxford University Press http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696797
FARRAR, DONALD E & LEE L SELWYN (1967) Taxes, corporate financial policy and return 
to investors  Working Paper Library of the Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology
http://www.archive.org/details/taxescorporatefi00farr
FRANKFURTER,  GEORGE M  &  BOB G  JR WOOD (1997)  The  evolution  of  corporate 
dividend  policy  Journal  of  Financial  Education,  23(1)  pp.  16-32  Published  by 
Financial Education Association
GORDON, MYRON J (1959) Dividends, earnings and stock prices Review of Economics 
and  Statistics,  41(2)  pp.  99-105  Published  by  The  MIT  Press
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1927792
JENSEN,  MICHAEL C (1986) Agency costs  of  free cash flow,  corporate  finance,  and 
takeovers  American Economic  Review,  76(2)  pp.  323-329 Published by American 
Economic Association http://www.jstor.org/stable/1818789
JONES, CHARLES P & JACK W WILSON (2002) An analysis of the s&p 500 index and 
cowles’s extensions: price indexes and stock returns, 1870–1999 Journal of Business, 
75(3)  pp.  505-533  Published  by  The  University  of  Chicago  Press
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/339903
KOTHARI, S P & JAY SHANKEN (1992) Stock return variation and expected dividends: a 
time-series and cross-sectional  analysis  Journal of Financial  Economics,  31(2) pp. 
177-210 Published by Elsevier http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(92)90003-G
43
LINTNER,  JOHN (1956)  Distribution  of  incomes  of  corporations  among  dividends, 
retained  earnings,  and  taxes  The  American  Economic  Review,  46(2)  pp.  97-113 
Published by American Economic Association http://www.jstor.org/stable/1910664
MILLER,  MERTON H & FRANCO MODIGLIANI (1961)  Dividend policy,  growth,  and the 
valuation  of  shares  Journal  of  Business,  34(4)  pp.  411-433  Published  by  The 
University of Chicago Press http://www.jstor.org/stable/2351143
MYERS, STEWART C (1984) The capital structure puzzle  Journal of Finance, 39(3) pp. 
575-592  Published  by  American  Finance  Association
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2327916
NOWAK,  ERIC (1998)  Finance,  investment,  and firm value  in  germany  and the  usa 
comparative  analysis   Discussion  Paper Humboldt  University
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.156208
SKINNER,  DOUGLAS J (2008) The evolving relation between earnings, dividends, and 
stock repurchases  Journal of Financial Economics, 87(3) pp. 582-609 Published by 
Elsevier http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.05.003
44
Appendix
Appendix
A.1  Contents of data disc......................................................................................................I
A.2  Dividend smoothing (Lintner Regression).....................................................................I
A.3  E-Mailing with S&P Capital IQ..................................................................................IV
A.4  Statistics.....................................................................................................................VII
Formula 1 and 2 – All compustat firms.......................................................................VIII
Formula 3 and 4 – All compustat firms..........................................................................IX
Formula 1 and 2 – NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ...........................................................X
Formula 3 and 4 – NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ.........................................................XI
Statistics from Data set Extraction................................................................................XII
A.5  Top Federal Income Tax Rates Since 1913..............................................................XIII
A.6  Compustat Code List................................................................................................XIV
A.1  Contents of data disc
• Data Codes / Variable Descriptions from Wharton
• Descriptive statistics for the regressions
• Excel spread sheet with coefficients for every year for every regression
• List of variables
• Tax brackets
• Source code and binary version of our statistics software
A.2  Dividend smoothing (Lintner Regression)
We are curious to see if we can find any evidence of dividend-smoothing in our data-set. 
Leaning on the findings of Lintner (1956), we have regressed the following equation:
Dt = Dt-1 + Et + c
Excluding the constant for now, and focusing on the slope of the earnings and the dividend 
variable, the following graph emerges:
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The mean coefficients are as follows:
Coef MEAN SE T
Constant 1.46 0.45 3.23
D(21)-1 0.88 0.03 32.09
E 0.04 0.01 6.30
The  dividend  variable  is  large  which  indicates  that  firms  smooth  their  dividends  in 
accordance with last year’s dividend. The mean coefficient for last years dividend is very 
significant,  32  standard-errors  from zero.  The  constant  is  very  large,  which  reflects  the 
variations in the data-set. In the next graph we have included the constant and the deviations 
are apparent:
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The spikes  in  the  mid-eighties  (top in  1988) and in  2006 suggests  that  there  were large 
dividend-payouts in these years, and that firms that had not previously paid out any large 
dividends, suddenly did so. We believe that this can be attributed to the adjustments in the 
tax-code. One was passed into law in 2003, which brought taxes on dividends down to the 
same level as capital gains, at 15%. The down-turn had not started yet, so we do not think 
this is an example of risk-shifting (transferring wealth to shareholders at the cost of debtors). 
Similarly,  the eighties were also a boom-period and in 1988 the taxes on dividends went 
down to the same level as capital gains.1
Alas, contrary to our previous regressions (Fama & French, 1998), we find a tax-effect. But it 
seems that it is only prevalent on this aggregate level in conjunction with large revisions to 
the tax-code. Event-studies have been able to prove this on a smaller level. They show that 
stocks do not fall by their full amount at the ex-dividend date, implying that investors have 
already included the tax in their calculations. We can only conclude that taxes matter, but 
dividends matter more.
1 Citizens for Tax Justice: “Tax rates 1913 on Nov 2011” - http://www.ctj.org/pdf/regcg.pdf
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A.3  E-Mailing with S&P Capital IQ
Hello Kyrre,
The United States companies included within Compustat can be listed on any major exchange you 
listed below as well as Over The Counter or Pink Sheet listings.  Our main criteria for adding is they 
must file regularly (annual 10-K and interim 10-Q report) with the SEC and they must have consistent 
pricing data as well.  I am not sure how WRDS presents the data but we do include Exchange data on 
the security level.
 
I am sorry if I did not explain it appropriately earlier, but we have increased the population of our  
database since 1993.  We do not delete companies that become inactive (either through bankruptcy or 
acquisition, etc) and we have added companies either through spin-offs, IPO’s or just general increase 
in our collection capabilities.  I cannot give you an exact number but the population of the database 
has increased significantly.  Please let me know if there is anything else.
Thank You,
Jason
Lead Product Consultant, Client Services
S&P Capital IQ
7400 South Alton Court
Centennial, CO 80112
800-523-4534
clientsupport@standardandpoors.com
 
-----Original Message-----
From: Kyrre Gregersen [mailto:Kyrre.Gregersen@stud.nhh.no]
Sent: Wednesday, January 04, 2012 11:31 AM
To: Standard & Poor's Client Support [NA]
Subject: RE: Compustat data (Case#789044 - Jason)
Hello Jason,
and thank you for your answer. As I understand there have been no increase in the number of firms 
prior to 1993. Is this correct?
And I hope you have the opportunity to answer another question: From which listings are Compustat 
firms drawn? The reason I am asking is that we suspect Fama and French might only have used data 
on firms that are listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX. When we extracted our data set, we ticked 
the "search the entire database" (and USD currency). Perhaps this could explain why our dataset is 
larger than the one FF used in their paper (FF1998)?
Thank you,
Kyrre Gregersen
-----Original Message-----
From: Standard & Poor's Client Support [NA] [mailto:clientsupport@standardandpoors.com]
Sent: Tue 20.12.2011 22:36
To: Kyrre Gregersen
Subject: Compustat data (Case#789044 - Jason)
Hello Kyrre,
After discussion with data researchers we believe the only difference that needs to be addressed is  
the increased populations of companies that we cover.  We have had some data definition changes  
and some collection procedures modified but in looking at the data items you are referencing there 
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should be no material differences compared to 1993. If you are looking at Global companies as 
well,  you  might  want  to  keep  in  mind  there  could  be  small  differences  based  on  the 
implementation of IFRS through Europe around 2005.  Again, with respect to the items you are 
pulling, you should not see any changes that would differ from the same items pulled in 1993 as 
IFRS does not affect the reporting or collection of these items.  Please let me know if you have any  
further questions.
Thank You,
Jason
Lead Product Consultant, Client Services
S&P Capital IQ
7400 South Alton Court
Centennial, CO 80112
800-523-4534
clientsupport@standardandpoors.com
-----Original Message-----
From: Kyrre Gregersen [mailto:Kyrre.Gregersen@stud.nhh.no]
Sent: Tuesday, December 20, 2011 4:08 AM
To: Standard & Poor's Client Support [NA]
Subject:
Sir,
first of all I have to thank you for providing such a comprehensive and user-friendly database. I 
have access to COMPUSTAT through WRDS and they have directed me to you.
I am, together with a co-student, doing research in dividends and follow the steps of Fama and  
French in their paper "Taxes, Financing Decisions, and Firm Value" (1998). In this paper they  
use only COMPUSTAT data. As we are trying to recreate their results, we need to find out if and 
what changes there have been in the data-material since the time when FF wrote their paper (or 
extracted  the  data,  possibly  as  early  as  1993).  I  suspect  one  change  might  be  that  more 
COMPUSTAT firms have been updated with a historical  shareprice,  and perhaps number of 
shares. Since not having either of this, is a ground for excluding the firm in the
regressions,  this  would  explain  why our  data-material  contains  more  firms  than  FF98,  even 
though we select variables on the exact same criterias. The most important variables we use are 
(time period 1965-1992):
DVC-Dividends paid to common shareholders(21)
XINT-Total interest paid (15)
XRD-R&D expenditures (46)
IB-Earnings before extraordinary items (18)
PRCC_F - Stock-price (199)
CSHPRI- Shares outstanding (54)
If we were to be provided with information as to if and how this data might have changed in the 
last ten years or so, it would be a great help to our work.
Sincerely
Kyrre Gregersen
Solution:
Dear Kyrre:
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Thanks, I can better understand you question now. We can find no statement from Compustat  
that would address your specific problem, although your conjecture of companies being added 
seems reasonable.
We do know that some companis are added at the request of Compustat customers, and probably 
with retroactive data. But as to any more general criteria, I think your best option is to contact  
compustat directly (clientsupport@sandp.com), as they know the data best.
regards,
WRDS Support
Sir,
thank you for your response. I apologize for my rather short description of my problem. The 
thing is that we are not using the CRSP database, only COMPUSTAT. The article I am refering 
to is "Taxes, Financing Decisions, and Firm Value" by Fama & French (1998). In this paper 
they use only COMPUSTAT data. As we are trying to recreate their results, we need to find out 
if and what changes there have been in the data-material. I suspect one change might be that  
more COMPUSTAT firms have been updated with a historical share price, and perhaps number 
of shares. Since not having either of this, is a ground for excluding the firm in the regressions, 
this  would explain why our  data-material  contains  more firms than FF98,  even though we 
select variables on the exact same criterias. The most important variables we use are (time 
period 1965-1992): 
DVC-Dividends paid to common shareholders(21)
XINT-Total interest paid (15)
XRD-R&D expenditures (46)
IB-Earnings before extraordinary items (18)
PRCC_F - Stock-price (199)
CSHPRI- Shares outstanding (54)
If we were to be provided with information as to if and how this data might have changed in ten 
years time, it would be a great help to our work.
Yours sincerely,
Kyrre Gregersen
-----Original Message-----
From: Wharton School - WRDS [mailto:wrds-support@wharton.upenn.edu]
Sent: ma 19.12.2011 01:51
To: Kyrre Gregersen
Subject: Ticket #632-8478272: A Response from the WRDS Support Team (Is
historical data being updated?)
Solution:
Your  answer  might  best  be  found  on  this  page  of  Ken  French's  web  site 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/changes_crsp.html):
"Please note: CRSP has recently completed the Pre62 Daily Data Series Project. The addition 
of these new daily data results  in changes to month-end prices and to dividend ex-dates. 
These changes have resulted in many small changes to historical returns on my website. For a
description of the project and the types of changes made, please refer to the Pre62 Project 
Notes. :
regards,
WRDS Support
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Ticket Information:
Ticket #: 8478272
Date Created: 12/16/2011 12:07 PM EDT
Summary: Is historical data being updated?
Details:
Username: kyrre
Email: kyrre.gregersen@stud.nhh.no
I am using the COMPUSTAT North America Annual database to get data to reproduce the 
results of Fama & French (1998). I am testing for the same time-period as they did, namely 
1965-1992. My question, since I have not been successfull in reproducing the exact same 
numbers, is whether the data have been changed in some way from then to now? I have 
based my dataselection on the same datacodes they refer to in their article.
If you have general questions, please direct them to
wrds-support@wharton.upenn.edu.
--------------------------------------------------------
The information contained in this message is intended only for the recipient,  and may be a confidential attorney-client communication or may 
otherwise be privileged and confidential and protected from disclosure. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, or an employee or 
agent responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient, please be aware that any dissemination or copying of this communication is  
strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please immediately notify us by replying to the message and deleting it from 
your computer. The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. reserves the right, subject to applicable local law, to monitor, review and process the content of 
any electronic message or information sent to or from McGraw-Hill e-mail addresses without informing the sender or recipient of the message. By  
sending electronic message or information to McGraw-Hill e-mail addresses you, as the sender, are consenting to McGraw-Hill  processing any of 
your personal data therein.
--------------------------------------------------------
A.4  Statistics
The following pages will show statistics for every coefficient for each year we ran the Fama 
& French, 1998, regressions. Then follow some statistics from the data set extraction, and 
federal US tax rates since 1913.
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Formula 1 and 2 – All compustat firms
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Formula 3 and 4 – All compustat firms
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Formula 1 and 2 – NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ
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Formula 3 and 4 – NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ
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Statistics from Data set Extraction
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A.5  Top Federal Income Tax Rates Since 1913
(top brackets are in nominal dollars)
Notes:
1. 1991-2009 and post 2010 rates include the tax-rate effects  of the personal exemption phase-out and the 
partial itemized deduction disallowan enacted in 1990. These provisions began to be phased out in 2006,  
were eliminated in 2010-12, and are scheduled to be reinstated in 2013.
2. 1993-2012 top regular rates on earned income include the 2.9% Medicare tax.
3. 2013-on top rates include the 3.8% Medicare tax on most earned and unearned income for high-income  
taxpayers enacted in 2010, and the scheduled expiration of the Bush tax cuts after 2012.
4. The  definition  of  taxable  income  varied  very  substantially  over  the  years.  Taxable  income  is  always 
substantially below actual income.
5. For multi-year periods with indexed tax brackets (post-1984) the top-bracket starting points are the averages 
for the periods.
Citizens for Tax Justice, November 2011.
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A.6  Compustat Code List
Page XIV of XIV
No# Item Code
DATA6 Assets - Total (MM$) AT Assets - Total
DATA54 Common Shares Used to Calculate EPS (MM) CSHPRI
DATA21 Dividends - Common (MM$) DVC
DATA18 Income Before Extraordinary Items (MM$) IB
DATA51 Investment Tax Credit (Income Acct)(MM$) ITCI
DATA181 Liabilities - Total (MM$) LT Liabilities - Total
DATA199 Price -- Fiscal Year -- Close ($&c) PRCC_F
DATA130 Preferred Stock - Carrying Value (MM$) PSTK
DATA10 Preferred Stock - Liquidating Value(MM$) PSTKL
DATA56 Preferred Stock - Redemption Value (MM$) PSTKRV
DATA50 Deferred Taxes (Income Account) (MM$) TXDI Income Taxes - Deferred
DATA35 Deferred Tax & Invest Tax Credit...(MM$) TXDITC
DATA16 Income Taxes - Total (MM$) TXT Income Taxes - Total
DATA15 Interest Expense (MM$) XINT
DATA46 Research and Development Expense (MM$) XRD
Common Shares Used to 
Calculate Earnings Per Share 
– Basic
Dividends 
Common/Ordinary
Income Before Extraordinary 
Items
Investment Tax Credit 
(Income Account)
Price Close - Annual - Fiscal 
Year
Preferred/Preference Stock 
(Capital) - Total
Preferred Stock – Liquidating 
Value
Preferred Stock – 
Redemption Value
Deferred Taxes and 
Investment Tax Credit
Interest and Related Expense 
- Total
Research and Development 
Expense
